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Has Everything Been Decided? 




Closing in on the Silver Anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,1 it is hard not to be astounded by the changes that it has 
occasioned to almost every facet of our criminal justice system. Its 
impact has been nothing short of revolutionary,2 moving our justice 
system sharply away from a crime control and toward a due process 
model.3 
A quick review of the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutional 
decisions from the 2005 calendar year, however, might leave one with 
the impression that the revolution is finally coming to an end. Compared 
to only a decade ago,4 the Court’s output in this important area seems to 
                                                                                                            
∗
 Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I would like to thank Alan Young, 
Renee Pomerance, Gary Trotter and Kent Roach for providing feedback on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Of course, any errors are mine alone. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 Kent Roach, “The Attorney General and the Charter Revisited” (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 1, at 
5. It is a revolution that Roach asserts “has fundamentally altered the law and discourse that 
governs the criminal process”. 
3 See generally Herbert L. Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Process” (1964) 113 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1. See also Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968). Packer uses the metaphor of a conveyor belt to describe the crime control 
model and an obstacle course to describe the due process model. For a Canadian account of post-
Charter developments in light of Packer’s models, see Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ 
Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1999). 
4 For example, in 1995 the Court decided approximately 25 cases that related to criminal 
law and the Charter. It should be remembered, however, that the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,  
c. C-46 [hereinafter “Code”] s. 691(2) was amended in 1997 to eliminate the automatic right to 
appeal to the Supreme Court that used to exist whenever an acquittal at trial was overturned by the 
court of appeal in the province.  
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have fallen off considerably.5 This might understandably cause some 
observers to believe that with the passage of time there is very little left 
to be decided. In other words, subject to the odd exception, the dust has 
finally settled. The Court has now spoken on almost every constitutional 
issue of any significance to criminal justice. Accordingly, in future we 
should expect to hear less and less from the Supreme Court on this 
subject. This is a view that would likely find some prominent backers, 
including Justice Moldaver of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.  
Respected for his expertise in criminal law, Justice Moldaver 
recently issued a strongly worded admonition to Ontario’s criminal 
defence lawyers when he spoke at their annual conference in the Fall of 
2005. He told the assembled audience that: “Most of the Charter issues 
that you are likely to encounter on a day-to-day basis have been 
thoroughly litigated, all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. By 
and large, the governing principles are now firmly established. And 
where that is so, the time for experimentation is over. It’s finished. It’s 
                                                                                                            
5 In contrast, in 2005, there were a total of nine cases that fit the bill. None of these 
related to substantive criminal law. There were seven that related to matters of Criminal Procedure, 
see: R. v. Gunning, [2005] S.C.J. No. 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 627 (Charter s. 11(f), right to jury trial — 
trial judge precluded from directing verdict of guilt); R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 
37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Orbanski & Elias”] (Charter s. 10(b), right to counsel — 
whether right is implicitly overridden at the roadside for the purpose of questioning drivers about 
alcohol consumption and requesting their participation in sobriety tests); Toronto Star Newspapers 
Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (Charter s. 2(b), freedom of expression 
and the press, whether open court principle extends to pre-trial procedures like search warrant 
application materials); R. v. Wiles, [2005] S.C.J. No. 53, 2005 SCC 84 (Charter s. 12, cruel and 
unusual punishment, whether imposition of firearms prohibition contravenes right); R. v. Pires; R. 
v. Lising, [2005] S.C.J. No. 67, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 343 [hereinafter “Pires & Lising”] (Charter s. 8, 
right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, preconditions for cross-examining search 
warrant affiant on s. 8 application); R. v. Decorte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 133 
(Charter s. 9, right not to be arbitrarily detained — whether First Nations Constables have legal 
authority to set up R.I.D.E. check-stops just outside reserves they are engaged primarily to serve); 
R. v. Spence, [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 (trial judges are not obligated to explore the 
interracial nature of crime during challenge for cause procedure whenever victim and accused are 
of different races). And two Evidence cases with a Criminal Law and Charter component: see R. v. 
Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, 2005 SCC 76 [hereinafter “Henry”] (Charter s. 13, right against self-
incrimination through prior testimony, whether right applies at retrial to preclude cross-examination 
of accused based on his testimony at first trial); R. v. Turcotte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 519 (Charter s. 7, right to silence, is right waived when a suspect answers some questions 
such that the failure to answer others may be the subject of evidence). This was roughly the same 
number of “criminal” Charter cases decided by the Court during the 2004 calendar year. See 
Eugene Meehan, Supreme Court of Canada 2004 Year-In-Review available online: 
<http://www.eugenemeehan.com/english/sccReview2004.asp>. 
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done.”6 The main point of his speech was as clear as it was strong: stop 
bringing spurious Charter applications. He forcefully argued that such 
motions are unduly prolonging criminal trials, choking the justice 
system and creating a backlog that is undermining public confidence in 
the system and threatening the administration of justice.7  
Anyone close to the criminal courts knows that these concerns are 
justified. Criminal trials are indeed taking much longer to complete than 
they did a generation ago and Charter litigation is the major cause. Poor 
judgment by many criminal defence counsel on what Charter issues are 
worth litigating, as well as a plodding and prolix approach by some in 
advancing these claims, are undoubtedly a part of the problem, as 
Justice Moldaver suggests.8 And, as he also noted, intransigent 
prosecutors must shoulder some of the blame; so must trial judges who 
fail to bring a quick end to frivolous Charter applications.9 Of course, 
Justice Moldaver readily concedes that with the Charter some delays are 
simply unavoidable. The reality is that litigating the constitutionality of 
how the police acquired the evidence against an accused takes time. His 
concern is with those delays that could be prevented if counsel were 
more reasonable in assessing potential Charter claims.  
My focus in this short paper will be on Justice Moldaver’s 
suggestion that when it comes to criminal justice and the Charter the 
governing principles are now firmly established and that the time for 
experimentation has mostly come to an end. I will respond to that claim 
by drawing on the Court’s Charter judgments from this past year. As 
noted, there were very few constitutional cases that touched on criminal 
law in 2005. At least superficially this would seem to support Justice 
Moldaver’s claim. As will become obvious, however, the numbers alone 
can be quite misleading. They tell only a very small part of the story. 
                                                                                                            
6 Justice Moldaver delivered the Sopinka Lecture on Advocacy at the Criminal Lawyers 
Association Annual Fall Conference, in Toronto, on October 22, 2005. See Christie Blatchford, 
“Justice delayed, justice denied” The Globe and Mail (25 November 2003) A23, wherein large 
portions of the original speech are reproduced, including the passage quoted here. The entire lecture 
is reproduced in the Criminal Reports. See Hon. Justice Michael Moldaver, “Long Criminal Trials: 
Masters of a System They Are Meant to Serve” (2005) 32 C.R. (6th) 316 [hereinafter “Moldaver”]. 
In the published version Justice Moldaver has backed away from some of stronger language used in 
his original address. For example, the last sentence in the excerpt above was revised to read: “By 
and large, the governing principles are now firmly established. And where that is so — where the 
basic principles have been established — any further experimentation should generally be limited 
to fine-tuning.” Id., at 322.  
7 Moldaver, id., at 320-23. 
8 Id. 
9 Id., at 319-20. 
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What matters much more in drawing out larger lessons from last year’s 
cases and forecasting future trends is the substance of those decisions 
that the Court did hand down. Here, my focus will be on three of the 
Court’s judgments: Pires & Lising,10 Henry11 and Orbanski & Elias.12 
Together these three cases serve to illustrate that despite occasional 
claims to the contrary by observers like Justice Moldaver, the reality is 
that there continues to be much uncertainty surrounding a number of 
very basic Charter issues relating to the criminal justice system.  
In the process of responding to Justice Moldaver’s claim, the paper 
will also take up the question of legal uncertainty in criminal Charter 
litigation more generally. Ultimately, my claim is that, generally 
speaking, there are two forms of uncertainty in this context. In Part II, 
what I term “unavoidable” or even “necessary” uncertainty will be 
considered. Here, our focus will be on how some degree of uncertainty 
is inherent and even constructive when it comes to the interpretation of 
the Charter’s open-ended and value-laden guarantees. In contrast, in 
Part III, we will explore the very different implications that arise when 
the law governing police powers is needlessly mired in uncertainty. 
Here, our focus will be on the rules that empower the police to interfere 
with individual liberty, as opposed to the Charter guarantees that are 
suppose to place minimum constitutional limits on police authority. The 
distinction is subtle but important. When it comes to the rules of police 
empowerment, beyond respecting minimum Charter requirements, our 
goals should equally be clarity and comprehensiveness. This is because 
uncertainty about the basic contours of police authority poses a serious, 
yet unnecessary, threat to the Charter rights of anyone who happens to 
come into conflict with police power.13 
                                                                                                            
10 Supra, note 5.  
11 Supra, note 5. 
12 Supra, note 5. 
13 I do not at all intend to suggest that certainty is the ultimate goal. Given how many 
actors (individuals, police, lawyers, judges) depend on clarity in the Court’s judgments and the 
stakes for those involved, certainty is obviously a very important consideration. On the importance 
of clear and coherent rules within the criminal process see generally Alan N. Young, “The Charter, 
the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutionalization of the Investigative Process” in Jamie 
Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 1. 
Of course, substance also matters a great deal. Procedurally clear but substantively flawed laws can 
occasion much injustice. Accordingly, the Court’s goal when operating in areas that implicate those 
individual interests protected by the Charter’s legal rights guarantees must also be to safeguard 
individuals from abuses of state power during the criminal investigative and adjudicative processes. 
See generally James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and 
the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 5-17. 
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II. NECESSARY UNCERTAINTY: PIRES & LISING AND HENRY  
Some uncertainty is of course inevitable in any constitutional system 
that gives common law courts the primary responsibility for interpreting 
a constitutional text on a case-by-case base. It is trite that in every case 
within such a system the resolution of some questions will need to be 
deferred until they are ripe for consideration in some future case. It 
would seem that Justice Moldaver’s point is that when it comes to the 
criminal justice system and the Charter most of the basic questions have 
now been decided, they are settled; but are they? In this part of the paper 
I intend to demonstrate that they are not. 
First, even questions that seem settled aren’t always so. In part, the 
long-term viability of any common law constitutional system very much 
depends on the authority and willingness of its final court of appeal to 
revisit established doctrine when experience has demonstrated that one 
of its earlier judgments is either being misconstrued or was wrongly 
decided.14 This seems especially true in a system such as ours in Canada 
where the Constitution is considered to be a “living tree”.15  
Just as important, for reasons going to its institutional integrity, the 
Court must proceed with great caution before substantially revamping 
established precedent or taking the drastic step of overruling an earlier 
judgment. If the Court appears too eager to revisit established principles 
then the authority of its judgments will be undermined and its 
institutional integrity will needlessly suffer. In other words, the 
institutional integrity of the Court would seem to depend both on its 
willingness to reconsider its past decisions when the reasons for doing 
so are compelling and the resolve to refrain from doing so when they are 
not.  
Contrary to claims that the time for Charter experimentation is over, 
cases like Pires & Lising and Henry demonstrate that the dust is far 
from settled, even when it comes to principles that may seem very well 
established. In each of these cases the Court revisited decisions that it 
                                                                                                            
14 Although it is difficult, try to imagine a world in which Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896) (which upheld school segregation based on the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine) 
was never overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
15 The “living tree” metaphor began its ascent into Canadian constitutional law under the 
British North America Act. See Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 136 
(P.C.), per Viscount Sankey. The Supreme Court has continued to embrace this metaphor in the 
Charter era. See e.g., Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155-56 
[hereinafter “Hunter”]. 
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had handed down in the relative infancy of the Charter. In the former 
case, Pires & Lising, the Court reaffirmed its prior judgment in order to 
avoid any uncertainty that may have grown up around it because of 
some important and related developments. In Henry, the Court took the 
far more drastic step of actually overruling its earlier decision. As we go 
forward in this Part the important point to remember is that some 
uncertainty is inevitable and even necessary within our constitutional 
system.  
1. The Judgment in Pires & Lising 
Let us begin with Pires & Lising. The appellants were charged with 
several drug-related offences. By way of pre-trial Charter motion they 
challenged the admissibility of certain wiretap evidence that had been 
obtained pursuant to the authority of several judicial authorizations. On 
this motion they sought leave to cross-examine the police officer who 
had sworn the affidavit to obtain judicial approval for the wiretaps. The 
trial judge refused leave, concluding that the preconditions set down by 
the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in R. v. Garofoli16 were not met. 
The appellants challenged that ruling unsuccessfully before the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal and then again before the Supreme Court. 
The apellants’ main argument was that the preconditions on the 
ability to cross-examine a warrant affiant set down in Garofoli — 
decided in 1990 — should be reconsidered. In Garofoli, in the course of 
some rather long reasons that dealt with a great many issues, Sopinka J. 
had indicated that before cross-examination would be permitted:  
A basis must be shown by the accused for the view that the cross-
examination will elicit testimony tending to discredit the existence of 
one of the preconditions to the authorization, as for example the 
existence of reasonable and probable grounds.17 
It was the need for leave to cross-examine that the appellants challenged 
in Pires & Lising. (In the alternative, they argued that under the 
Garofoli test they should have been permitted to cross-examine in any 
event.)  
The appellants pointed to a number of important developments since 
Garofoli in arguing in favour of a more relaxed approach. For example, 
                                                                                                            
16 [1990] S.C.J. No. 115, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 [hereinafter “Garofoli”]. 
17 Id., at 1465. 
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there was the repeal of the automatic exclusionary rule that was in the 
former section 178.16 of the Code. It had imposed the burden on the 
Crown to establish the existence of a valid authorization. Failing that, 
the evidence obtained would be excluded. With the 1993 amendments 
the legal burden shifted squarely to the accused to show a Charter 
violation and to justify exclusion under section 24(2).18 The appellants 
argued that this shift in onus necessitated a relaxation of the initial 
threshold requirement that must be met before cross-examination is 
permitted. Absent that, the appellants argued that Garofoli, combined 
with the 1993 amendments, would undermine the ability of accused 
persons to challenge the sub-facial validity of wiretap authorizations. 
In addition, there were three larger trends in the post-Garofoli 
jurisprudence that the Appellants emphasized in arguing for a relaxation 
of the requirements: first, clear and express recognition by the Court of 
the critical importance of cross-examination;19 second, developments 
with respect to the lower standard for the admissibility of defence 
evidence;20 and, finally, the well established notion that rights require 
remedies and an argument that maintaining Garofoli’s requirements to 
cross-examine would impede access to the Charter’s remedial scheme. 
Before moving on to address how the Court responded to this claim, 
it is worthwhile to pause here and emphasize that the argument 
advanced by the Appellants was not without merit. A great deal has 
indeed changed since Garofoli was decided. The idea that the Supreme 
Court might be prepared to reconsider its judgment in that case a mere 
15 years after it was decided was not at all far-fetched. For example, it 
was only 11 years between the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. 
Landry21 (decided in 1986) defining the common law requirements for 
entry into private premises to effect an arrest and the Court’s decision in 
R. v. Feeney22 embracing the warrant requirement it had specifically 
rejected in Landry. In changing course in Feeney the Court had 
                                                                                                            
18 This was because the normal rules governing Charter applications then applied. In other 
words, the applicant bears the burden on a balance of probabilities. See R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. 
No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 [hereinafter “Collins”]. 
19 See e.g., R. v. Lyttle, [2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, at para. 41.  
20 See e.g., R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at para. 43. 
21 [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 45.  
22 [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 [hereinafter “Feeney”]. 
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emphasized subsequent developments under section 8 of the Charter 
relating to the protection of privacy.23  
In Pires & Lising the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the 
appellants’ claim that developments over the intervening years 
warranted a change in approach. Although the legal burden had shifted 
the evidentiary burden had remained firmly on the Crown. Once a 
search is challenged, it is the Crown that must show the existence of a 
facially valid authorization. Failing that, the search or seizure will be 
presumed to be unreasonable and the applicant will have discharged its 
legal burden.24 In other words, as a practical matter those challenging the 
validity of a search warrant are not worse off than they were before the 
amendments. This is especially true because of developments over the 
intervening years that actually work to the advantage of accused persons 
when it comes to making a preliminary showing that cross-examination 
is necessary. Today, unlike when Garofoli was decided, accused persons 
can quite easily gain access to the affidavit sworn to obtain a warrant,25 
as well as other investigatory materials that will shed considerable light 
on whether or not cross-examination of the affiant might prove useful in 
mounting a challenge to the warrant.26 As the Court points out, “the 
defence does not arrive empty-handed at the evidentiary hearing”.27 
The Court concluded that the appellant’s reliance on cases that 
emphasize the importance of cross-examination and the ability of the 
defence to introduce evidence at trial was misplaced. The basis for a 
sub-facial challenge to a warrant is actually quite narrow. The reviewing 
judge does not conduct a de novo hearing. Rather, she is limited to a 
consideration of whether there was any basis upon which the 
authorizing judge could be satisfied that the relevant statutory 
preconditions were satisfied.28 For the Court these differences in context 
were important. Given the limited basis for conducting a sub-facial 
                                                                                                            
23 Id., at paras. 42-51.  
24 A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter, 
which as a practical matter means that the burden shifts to the Crown. See Collins, supra, note 18.  
25 See R. v. Dersch, [1990] S.C.J. No. 113, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505 (holding that once the 
admission of the evidence is challenged an accused is entitled to access to the authorization packet 
submitted by police in order to permit full answer and defence). 
26 See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (holding that the 
defence is entitled to all material in the possession or control of the Crown that is potentially 
relevant to the case whether favourable to the accused or not).  
27 Pires & Lising, supra, note 5, at para. 27. 
28 See generally Garofoli, supra, note 16, at 1451-52. See also R. v. Araujo, [2000] S.C.J. 
No. 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992. 
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attack on a search pursuant to warrant, the need for some preliminary 
showing by an accused that cross-examination might be fruitful remains 
important. As Charron J. noted for the Court in Pires & Lising, “[t]here 
is no point in permitting cross-examination if there is no reasonable 
likelihood that it will impact on the question of the admissibility of the 
evidence”.29 Garofoli set down a leave requirement in order to avoid 
valuable court time being wasted by the exploration of what is 
ultimately irrelevant evidence. In other words, the “Garofoli threshold 
test is all about relevancy. If the proposed cross-examination is not 
relevant to a material issue, within the narrow scope of the review of 
admissibility, there is no reason to permit it”.30 Any other course would 
ignore concerns about the prolixity of proceedings and, in many cases, 
the need to protect informants. For the Court these concerns were as 
important today as they were in 1990. As a result, it left Garofoli’s leave 
requirement intact. 
Nevertheless, the Court sensibly seized the opportunity to provide 
some guidance on what sort of showing is required by the leave 
requirement set down in Garofoli. As noted, the Court in that case had 
dealt with a host of different section 8 Charter issues. In the result, it had 
concluded that Garofoli had wrongly been denied the opportunity to 
cross-examine the affiant in his case.31 Possibly due to the brevity of the 
Court’s reasons in Garofoli on this discrete issue, over the intervening 
years trial courts had been rather inconsistent in applying the leave 
requirement.32 This practical reality would have no doubt informed the 
decision of counsel for Pires and Lising to challenge Garofoli. For 
similar reasons, the time was also right for the Court to revisit the issue 
and provide some needed guidance — which is exactly what it did: 
… in determining whether cross-examination should be permitted, 
counsel and the reviewing judge must remain strictly focused on the 
question to be determined on a Garofoli review — whether there is a 
basis upon which the authorizing judge could grant the order. If the 
proposed cross-examination is not likely to assist in the determination 
of this question, it should not be permitted. However, if the proposed 
                                                                                                            
29 Pires & Lising, supra, note 5, at para. 31.  
30 Id. 
31 Garofoli, supra, note 16, at 1466. 
32 See Michal Fairburn, “Litigating the Warranted Search: A Practical Overview” (Paper 
presented to the Fourth Symposium on Issues in Search and Seizure Law in Canada, November 
2005) (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, Professional Development Program, 2005), at 10-12. 
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cross-examination falls within the narrow confines of this review, it is 
not necessary for the defence to go further and demonstrate that cross-
examination will be successful in discrediting one or more of the 
statutory preconditions for the authorization. Such a strict standard 
was rejected in Garofoli. A reasonable likelihood that it will assist the 
court to determine a material issue is all that must be shown.33 
Quite sensibly, this passage is followed by a number of specific 
examples from the case law regarding the sort of circumstances in 
which cross-examination should be permitted.34 The Court closes off by 
carefully reviewing the facts in this case in order to explain why the 
appellants had failed to meet the standard, providing another concrete 
example of the standard in application.35  
Returning briefly to my larger point, the Court’s decision in Pires & 
Lising provides a useful example for our purposes here. The Supreme 
Court had set down the threshold test in Garofoli only 15 years earlier. 
Nevertheless, experience over the intervening years revealed much 
confusion regarding how onerous the Supreme Court intended the 
threshold requirement to be. In addition, the constitutional landscape 
had changed considerably in the interim. Given these circumstances it is 
understandable why counsel for Pires and Lising thought the time might 
be right to try and convince the Court to reconsider its earlier decision. 
Similarly, the Court was also justified in deciding to revisit its earlier 
judgment and provide some needed clarification.  
Pires & Lising effectively illustrates that even well established 
constitutional principles benefit from periodic review and renewal. 
Subjecting long-standing doctrine to continued debate in light of 
contemporary circumstances ensures the Charter’s vitality and is in 
keeping with the “living tree” theory of our Constitution. Of course, this 
sort of review will occasionally lead the Court to conclude that a prior 
judgment was wrongly decided and needs to be overturned. This is 
exactly what happened in Henry. 
                                                                                                            
33 Pires & Lising, supra, note 5, at para. 40. 
34 Id., at paras. 42 through 44. See also id., at para. 69. 
35 Id., at paras. 49-68. Here, the appellants emphasized a single statement in the affidavit 
which did serve to create a false impression on a point that the trial judge, the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court all concluded was rather inconsequential to the issuance of 
the authorization.  There was an innocent explanation for the misstatement and therefore no real 
basis to suggest that it was deliberate. Where there is some basis to think that a false statement was 
included with the intention to mislead the Court indicated that leave to cross-examine should be 
granted. That was not this case. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.  
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2. The Judgment in Henry 
The Supreme Court has considered section 13 of the Charter on a 
number of prior occasions.36 In Henry that guarantee was again front and 
centre. It reads:  
A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have 
any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in 
any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the 
giving of contradictory evidence. 
Unfortunately, the Court’s past decisions interpreting section 13 drew 
two difficult distinctions that have sometimes proven elusive in 
application. 
First, what exactly constitutes “any other proceedings”? Some cases 
are easy. For example, protection of an accused person from use of his 
evidence at the preliminary inquiry or trial of a third party is obvious. 
More difficult is the situation of an accused who testifies at his own trial 
which then either results in a mistrial or culminates in a successful 
appeal. Does the guarantee protect that accused from use of his prior 
testimony at any subsequent retrial? In Dubois37 the Supreme Court held 
that a retrial for the same offence falls within the meaning of the words 
“any other proceedings”. But what about the accused person who 
testifies on a voir dire, can that evidence then be used by the Crown at 
the trial proper or is the voir dire a separate proceeding? Although that 
issue has never directly come before the Court, it has signalled in rather 
strong obiter that the voir dire and trial proper should be considered 
separate proceedings for section 13 Charter purposes.38  
Second, once the guarantee in section 13 of the Charter is engaged, 
what does it actually protect against? On its face, the provision speaks 
of not having evidence “used to incriminate … except for a prosecution 
for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence”. Over the last 20 
years the Court has experienced considerable difficulty giving this 
                                                                                                            
36 See R. v. Dubois, [1985] S.C.J. No. 69, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350 [hereinafter “Dubois”]; R. v. 
Mannion, [1986] S.C.J. No. 53, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272 [hereinafter “Mannion”]; R. v. Kuldip, [1990] 
S.C.J. No. 126, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 618; R. v. Noël, [2002] S.C.J. No. 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 433 
[hereinafter “Noël”]; R. v. Allen, [2003] S.C.J. No. 16, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 223 [hereinafter “Allen”].  
37 Id.  
38 See R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, at para. 66. As a practical 
matter the issue has not arisen because there is established case law that predates the Charter which 
holds that an accused’s testimony on a voir dire is not admissible on the trial proper. See Erven v. 
The Queen, [1978] S.C.J. No. 114, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 926, at 932.  
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language consistent and coherent meaning. Here is a brief summary of 
the Court’s prior rulings that take up this issue:  
 
• In Dubois the accused was being retried following a successful 
appeal. The Court held that section 13 precluded the Crown from 
introducing as part of its own case a transcript of the accused’s 
evidence from his first trial.  
• In Mannion the Crown cross-examined the accused on 
inconsistencies between his testimony at his first trial and the 
answers he gave when testifying at his retrial. The Court held that 
section 13 precluded the Crown from engaging in this sort of 
questioning. 
• In Kuldip the Crown had again cross-examined the accused on 
inconsistencies between his testimony at his first trial and the 
answers he gave when testifying at his retrial. This time the Court 
drew a distinction between use of prior testimony for the purpose of 
“incriminating” an accused, which the Court said is to establish guilt 
and runs afoul of section 13, and use for “impeachment” purposes, 
which the Court said is elicited merely to contradict and undermine 
credibility. 
• In Noël the Crown had cross-examined an accused about testimony 
he had given at an accomplice’s trial. Here, the Court acknowledged 
the difficulty created by its earlier decision in Kuldip and the 
distinction drawn between incrimination and impeachment. In Noël 
the Court held that section 13 provides that, when an accused 
testifies at trial, he or she cannot be cross-examined on prior 
testimony to impeach credibility unless the trial judge is satisfied 
that there is no realistic danger that the prior testimony could be 
used to incriminate the accused.39 
The interpretive challenge with section 13 of the Charter that 
seemed to finally come to a head in Noël was the difficult distinction 
that the Court had attempted to draw between incrimination and 
impeachment. A difference that was better understood in theory than it 
was in practice. The reality is that whenever the Crown is attempting to 
                                                                                                            
39 It should be noted that Allen, supra, note 36, involves a straightforward application of 
the principle from Noël.  
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use an accused’s prior testimony it is doing so in order to advance its 
case against him with the ultimate objective of proving his guilt.40 For 
this reason the distinction between incrimination and impeachment has 
at times seemed rather artificial.  
In Henry it was the impossibility of drawing such a distinction that 
the appellants hoped to make the focus of their appeal. Both men had 
been convicted of murder at their first trial. They successfully appealed 
against those convictions. At their retrial, which pre-dated the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Noël, both men testified in their own defence and 
each gave a substantially different account than they had at their first 
trial. The Crown cross-examined them on the differences in their 
respective stories from the first trial to the second and both men were 
again convicted. The discrete issue before the Supreme Court of Canada 
was whether the cross-examination at their subsequent trial ran afoul of 
section 13 of the Charter.  
The Court began its judgment by reiterating the purpose behind 
section 13 of the Charter, as articulated in Dubois: “to protect 
individuals from being indirectly compelled to incriminate themselves, 
to ensure that the Crown will not be able to do indirectly that which  
s. 11(c) prohibits”.41 It contrasted that purpose with what it characterized 
as the position being advanced by the appellants, which it described as 
follows: “that an accused can volunteer one story at his or her first trial, 
have it rejected by the jury, then after obtaining a retrial on an unrelated 
ground of appeal volunteer a different and contradictory story to a jury 
differently constituted in the hope of a better result because the second 
jury is kept in the dark about the inconsistencies.”42 Through this 
description of the appellants’ position the Court made clear at the outset 
that this case was not going to turn on the impossible distinction 
between incrimination and impeachment.  
                                                                                                            
40 See Hamish Stewart & Erica Bussey, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Too 
Strong, Too Weak, or Both?” (2005) 9 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 369, at 377-78; M. Naeem Rauf, 
“Section 13 of the Charter and the Use of an Accused’s Prior Testimony: A Reply to David 
Doherty and Ronald Delisle” (1991) 4 C.R. (4th) 42, at 48; Don Stuart, Charter Justice and 
Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2005), at 467-68. See also R. v. 
Kuldip, [1988] O.J. No. 40, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 11, at 23 C.C.C. (C.A.) where Martin J. acknowledged 
this reality when the case was before the Court of Appeal. 
41 This passage can be found in Dubois, supra, note 36, at 358. See also Kuldip, supra, 
note 36, at 629. It is reproduced in Henry in a couple of places. See Henry, supra, note 5, at paras. 2 
and 22.  
42 Henry, supra, note 5, at para. 2.  
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Rather, the Court in Henry seized the opportunity to acknowledge 
that its earlier judgments dealing with section 13 had been less than 
consistent. The Court attributed this confusion to a failure on its part to 
keep the purpose of the guarantee at the forefront in its analysis and to 
instead focus on the particular purpose for which the evidence was 
being used (i.e., incrimination versus impeachment). With this change 
of emphasis the Court proceeded to draw out yet another distinction, the 
difference between the accused who was merely a witness in a prior 
proceeding and who was therefore truly compelled to testify and the 
accused who chose to take the stand at an earlier trial and thereby 
voluntarily gave up the absolute right not to be compelled to testify 
which is guaranteed by section 11(c) of the Charter. For the Henry 
Court the sensible solution to all of the confusion that had grown up 
around section 13 was to return to first principles, the underlying 
purpose of the guarantee — affording protection against compelled self-
incrimination. With that purpose in mind, the Court proceeded to survey 
its past judgments. 
In the end, the Court concluded that for the most part its earlier 
decisions could be reconciled with the underlying purpose of section 13 
of the Charter. There were some exceptions, however, that needed to be 
reconsidered. The Court acknowledged that it should not depart from its 
own precedents unless there are compelling reasons for doing so,43 
noting that it should be “particularly careful before reversing a 
precedent where the effect is to diminish Charter protection”.44 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that with respect to developments 
relating to section 13 of the Charter there were very good reasons for 
doing just that.  
                                                                                                            
43 Henry, supra, note 5, at 44. The Court cited a number of its prior decisions in support of 
this proposition. See R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654; R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 
S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 [hereinafter “Chaulk”]; R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 22, 
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 740; R. v. Robinson, [1996] S.C.J. No. 32, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683; Clark v. Canadian 
National Railway, [1988] S.C.J. No. 90, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680. It then proceeded to list a number of 
examples where the Court in fact took this significant step. See United States v. Burns, [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights 
Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 80, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489; Brooks v. Canadian Safeway Ltd., [1989] 
S.C.J. No. 42, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.  
44 Henry, supra, note 5, at para. 44. See also R. v. Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 833, at 860-61 (Dickson C.J., dissenting) indicating that the principle of certainty and the 
institutional limits imposed on the law-making functions of the courts should similarly constrain the 
Court from overruling a past decision where the effect would be to expand criminal liability. Chief 
Justice Dickson’s comments in Bernard were later adopted by a majority of the Court. See Chaulk, 
id., at 1353. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) Has Everything Been Decided? 395 
Beginning with Mannion, the Court concluded that it must be 
overturned for a number of reasons. It will be remembered that Mannion 
was the case in which the accused was cross-examined at a retrial using 
evidence he had given at his first trial. In that decision the Court drew 
no distinction between incrimination and impeachment. Rather, it 
simply held that the cross-examination of Mr. Mannion on 
inconsistencies between his evidence in both proceedings served to 
incriminate him and ran afoul of section 13 of the Charter.45  
In Henry, the Court noted that the decision in Mannion failed to take 
into account the purpose underlying section 13 of the Charter, protecting 
against compelled self-incrimination. Second, to maintain Mannion 
would allow individuals who were not in any sense “compelled” to 
testify at their former trial, like the two appellants in Henry, to take 
advantage of the Court’s holding in Noël in a manner that would require 
a cumbersome and unworkable application of the incrimination/ 
impeachment distinction. The third and, according to the Court, most 
important reason for overruling Mannion was to be better able to protect 
the position of those who are truly compelled. The Court reasoned that 
treating accused persons who are required to testify as witnesses in an 
earlier proceeding the same as accused persons who choose to testify at 
successive trials lessens the protection for the former. Noël’s “no 
possibility” test may seem sensible when applied to those who were 
compelled to testify but results in absurd outcomes when applied in 
cases like Henry. Such a result is not consistent with the underlying 
purpose of section 13 of the Charter. For all these reasons the Court in 
Henry decided to take the unusual step of expressly overruling 
Mannion. 
Next the Court turned its attention to Kuldip. It too involved the 
cross-examination of an accused at his second trial based on evidence he 
had given at his first trial. It will be remembered that this is the case in 
which the Court first introduced the impeachment versus incrimination 
distinction. This is a distinction that the Henry Court quite sensibly 
concluded was no longer tenable. The Court noted that to the extent that 
Kuldip allowed for the cross-examination of an accused on his 
inconsistent testimony volunteered at his first trial, it should be 
affirmed. In contrast, to the extent it had shielded such an accused from 
                                                                                                            
45 See Mannion, supra, note 36, at 280. 
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cross-examination that was said to “incriminate” the decision was 
overruled.  
Finally, the Court briefly revisited its recent decision in Noël. In that 
case the accused was cross-examined by the Crown at his own trial 
based on testimony he was compelled to give at the earlier trial of his 
accomplice. For the Court, this represented a classic example of the sort 
of compulsion that section 13 of the Charter is principally aimed at 
protecting against. As a result, the decision was easily reconciled with 
the Henry Court’s renewed emphasis on compulsion as the linchpin of 
section 13. Nevertheless, Noël had struggled to maintain the awkward 
distinction between incrimination and impeachment that had found its 
genesis in Kuldip. For the Henry Court it made little sense to try and 
maintain that distinction any longer. Although the Court acknowledged 
that the plain language in section 13 provided support for maintaining it, 
it understandably conceded that, “experience has demonstrated the 
difficulty in practice of working with that distinction”.46 The Court 
therefore concluded that “prior compelled evidence should, under s. 13 
as under s. 5(2) [of the Canada Evidence Act], be treated as inadmissible 
in evidence against the accused, even for the ostensible purpose of 
challenging his or her credibility, and be restricted (in the words of s. 13 
itself) to a ‘prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory 
evidence’”. 47 
In the result, given that both appellants in Henry had been cross-
examined on the testimony that they had volunteered at their first trial 
the necessary element of compulsion was lacking. In other words, 
section 13 of the Charter no longer applies to accused persons who 
testify at successive trials. An accused who chooses to forego their right 
to silence at an earlier trial is not compelled in that proceeding. As a 
result, should that accused again choose to testify at a retrial there is 
nothing about permitting them to then be cross-examined on any 
inconsistencies between their evidence at both trials that is contrary to 
the goal behind section 13 of the Charter. 
Returning momentarily to our larger enterprise, Henry provides an 
excellent example of how even established principles can gradually be 
eroded by the lessons of experience. Less than 20 years had elapsed 
between Mannion and Henry. Nevertheless, within that comparatively 
                                                                                                            
46 Henry, supra, note 5, at para. 50. 
47 Id., at para. 50. 
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short period an idea that had managed to gain the support of a 
unanimous seven-member panel of the Supreme Court had fallen into 
disfavour. Henry is an example that aptly demonstrates that within a 
common law constitutional system such as ours even well-established 
principles are continually open to being challenged and, if proven 
wanting, overruled. Of course, even with this most recent development 
one is hard-pressed to now claim that the debate surrounding the 
meaning of section 13 has finally ended and that the time for 
experimentation is forever over.  
There is much to be thankful for about the Court’s decision in Henry. 
First, the decision provides a useful reminder of the underlying purpose 
behind section 13 of the Charter and makes a good effort to rationalize the 
established case law in light of that larger objective. Second, the case 
sensibly eliminates the artificial and practically unworkable incrimination 
versus impeachment distinction. Unfortunately, in the process of 
redressing some of the confusion created by its past decisions the Court 
does manage to create some uncertainty of its own. 
Most significantly, the Court expressly reaffirms its prior decision 
in Dubois.48 This is the case involving a retrial at which the Crown 
tendered as part of its own case a transcript of the accused’s evidence at 
his first trial. The accused chose not to testify at the retrial. In rejecting 
the notion that Dubois also had to be overruled, the Court shifted its 
focus from the absence of any compulsion at the earlier proceeding to 
the circumstances of the new trial. It reasoned that: 
The rationale underlying Dubois for extending s. 13 protection to an 
accused in a retrial, however, was because when a “new” trial is 
ordered the accused is entitled not to testify at all. Thus, to allow the 
Crown simply to file the testimony of the accused given at the prior 
trial (now overturned) would permit the Crown indirectly to compel 
the accused to testify at the retrial where s. 11(c) of the Charter would 
not permit such compelled self-incrimination directly. The Crown 
must prove its case without recruiting the accused to self-
incriminate.49 
                                                                                                            
48 Henry, supra, note 5, at paras. 39-40. 
49 Id., at para. 39. 
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As Professor Hamish Stewart has argued, this effort to distinguish 
Dubois seems less than persuasive.50 If “compulsion” is the key, then 
section 13 of the Charter should serve as no barrier to the admission of 
testimony by an accused that was volunteered at an earlier trial or, by 
analogy, at an unrelated trial or on a voir dire. If the reason that 
admitting prior testimony in subsequent proceedings is offensive is 
because there is something inherently unfair about allowing the Crown 
to gain an advantage from some flaw in the earlier trial (that led to a 
mistrial or a successful appeal) then compulsion would not seem to be 
the animating concern after all. But, if this is true, then why do these 
concerns about unfairness not persist when the accused then makes the 
choice to take the stand at the second trial? How does that subsequent 
choice serve to vitiate the unfairness of giving the Crown a tactical 
advantage that it would not otherwise have had but for the legally 
flawed first trial?51 These are important questions that the Henry Court 
does not answer. Accordingly, there would seem to be much room for 
future development in this important area of Charter law.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in both Pires & Lising and Henry 
serve to remind us of an important point about law in a common law 
constitutional system such as ours. That is, even principles that may 
seem well established are always open to being reconsidered in light of 
experience. This is because, as Holmes observed, the “life of the law has 
not been logic: it has been experience”.52 The notion that we will reach a 
point in any area of law where all questions are settled, especially an 
area as contested and challenging as the interpretation of broadly 
worded and value laden constitutional guarantees, is simply not realistic. 
In other words, some level of uncertainty is not only inevitable but also 
essential to the vitality of our constitutional order. As Dickson J. noted 
on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court in Hunter v. Southam,53 our 
Constitution must “be capable of growth and development over time to 
meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its 
framers”.54 In short, the dust will never settle. The document will always 
remain a work in progress. 
                                                                                                            
50 See Hamish Stewart, “Henry in the Supreme Court of Canada: Reorienting the s. 13 
Right against Self-incrimination” (2006) 34 C.R. (6th) 112.  
51 Id., at 116-18. 
52 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1923), at ch. 1.  
53 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
54 Id., at 155. 
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III. AVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTY: ORBANSKI & ELIAS 
To this point, our focus has been on what I term “unavoidable” or even 
“necessary” uncertainty. In this section we shift gears and focus on an 
area that although related is actually quite different than the subject of 
constitutional interpretation more generally. This is the law relating to 
police powers. Obviously, the meaning of many of the Charter’s Legal 
Rights guarantees will bear on police investigative powers by imposing 
constitutional limits on police authority. That is, however, a very 
different question than the source and scope of police power. Here, it is 
essential to remember another important passage from Hunter v. 
Southam that in recent years has too often been forgotten. Before 
identifying the larger purpose behind section 8 of the Charter, or 
elaborating on its requirements, Dickson J. indicated:  
I begin with the obvious. The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is a purposive document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to 
protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to constrain governmental action 
inconsistent with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an 
authorization for governmental action. In the present case this 
means . . . that in guaranteeing the right to be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, s. 8 acts as a limitation on 
whatever powers of search and seizure the federal or provincial 
governments already and otherwise possess. It does not in itself confer 
any powers, even of “reasonable” search and seizure, on these 
governments.55 
Although this point seems obvious, it is important. The Charter and the 
Supreme Court’s judgments under it were never intended to serve as a 
source of new and previously unimagined police powers.  
This is not to say that the Charter was not expected to have some 
impact on the criminal investigative process. From the beginning, it was 
apparent to everyone that its effects would undoubtedly be great. A 
number of its provisions speak directly to the regulation of police 
authority. What was not apparent at the outset was the pressure that it 
would place on the courts to create new police powers. The Charter — 
largely because of its exclusionary remedy — served to reveal serious 
deficiencies in the scattered collection of statutory and common law 
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rules which make up the law of police powers in Canada. Although, at 
times, the Supreme Court has been sceptical about acting to correct 
these shortcomings,56 in recent years it has taken a much more proactive 
approach in filling gaps in police authority.  
The Court has employed a variety of law-making devices over the 
last 20 years to essentially make up for shortcomings in police powers.57 
For example, it has used what has come to be known interchangeably as 
the “Waterfield test”58 or the “ancillary powers doctrine” to recognize 
new police investigative powers at “common-law”.59 Similarly, it has 
essentially abandoned the rule of strict construction for statutory 
enactments that authorize state intrusions on individual liberty that had 
long dominated in the era before the Charter.60 Instead, the Court has 
routinely read language into legislation to make up for deficiencies in 
                                                                                                            
56 See id. See also R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 56-57.  
57 See generally James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police 
Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J.1, at 17-48 [Stribopoulos, “In Search of 
Dialogue”].  
58 See R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (Ct. Crim. App.) [hereinafter “Waterfield”]. 
That case developed a test for assessing whether a police officer was acting in the “execution of his 
duty” in order to determine the potential culpability of an accused charged with the offence of 
obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty. That test was transformed into a means of 
recognizing new police investigative powers by the Supreme Court of Canada in its controversial 
judgment in R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 [hereinafter “Dedman”] 
where the Court recognized at “common-law” a police power to conduct sobriety check-stops of 
motorists. It has since used the test on two other occasions. In R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, 
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 to create a police power to enter private residences in response to disconnected 
911 calls. Then again in R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 to recognize a police 
power to detain suspects for criminal investigative purposes. 
59 For a more detailed description and critique of these developments see James 
Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. 
Rev. 335, at 349-55. [Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment?”]. See also Tim Quigley, “Brief 
Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935. 
60 Before the Charter, the Supreme Court had recognized that when dealing with such a 
statute, “that if real ambiguities are found, or doubts of substance arise . . . then the statute should 
be applied in such a manner as to favour the person against whom it is sought to be enforced”. 
Marcotte v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1974] S.C.J. No. 142, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 108, at 
115. This principle had been applied equally to circumstances where the law encroached on 
individual liberty (see R. v. Noble, [1977] S.C.J. No. 68, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 632, at 638; Beatty v. 
Kozak, [1958] S.C.J. No. 9, [1958] S.C.R. 177, at 190, affg (1957), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 88 (Sask. C.A.); 
Shim v. R., [1938] S.C.R. 378, at 380-81) or property interests (see Laidlaw v. Metropolitan 
Toronto [1978] S.C.J. No. 32, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 736, at 748; Prince George (City) v. Payne, [1977] 
S.C.J. No. 53, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 458, at 463; Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] S.C.J. No. 50, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 199, at 218; R. v. Colet, [1981] S.C.J. No. 2, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 2, at 11).  
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formal police powers.61 In Orbanski & Elias we find the Court blending 
both of these law-making devices together in order to confer upon 
police a power that is not expressly granted by statute. Amazingly, this 
implied power is then used by the Court to effect an override of what is 
an express Charter right! 
At issue in Orbanksi & Elias (separate cases heard and decided 
together) was the scope of police authority when conducting a roadside 
sobriety check-stop. In particular, whether the police are authorized to 
ask a driver about her prior alcohol consumption or request that he or 
she participate in roadside sobriety tests without first appraising the 
driver of his or her right to counsel guaranteed by section 10(b) of the 
Charter. Given established case law, the Crown readily conceded that 
there had been a “detention” in each of these cases for section 10 
Charter purposes.62 Similarly, there was no doubt that in neither case did 
the police properly comply with their informational obligations under 
section 10(b). The only issue then was whether these section 10(b) 
violations were justified under section 1 of the Charter. Of course, in 
order for this to be the case the override must be “prescribed by law”.63 
As a result, the legal authority to question detained motorists and 
request that they participate in roadside sobriety tests was the focus of 
this appeal. 
Both cases originated in Manitoba. At the time,64 although 
legislation in the province conferred express authority on police officers 
to stop motorists it did not expressly mention any power to question 
                                                                                                            
61 See generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57, at 30-41. For 
example, the Court read a police power to break into private premises to install and maintain 
listening devices into the Criminal Code scheme governing wiretaps. See R. v. Lyons, [1984] S.C.J. 
No. 63, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 633 and Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s. 27(1), [1984] S.C.J. No. 
64, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697. It also read a power on the part of teachers and school administrators to 
search into a provincial Education Act that was entirely silent as to the existence of such a power. 
See R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393. It also read a power to detain 
suspected alimentary canal smugglers at ports of entry for extended periods (until they provide a 
urine sample or defecate under state supervision) into a provision in the Customs Act which simply 
refers to a power to “search”. See R. v. Monney, [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652.  
62 See Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at para. 2. See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 641-44; R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 647-
50 [hereinafter “Thomsen”]; R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 631-32;  
R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257. 
63 Charter, supra, note 1, s. 1. 
64 Since the time of Orbanski & Elias’ respective stops, Manitoba amended its provincial 
Highway Traffic Act to expressly override the right to counsel at the roadside. See Highway Traffic 
Act, S.M. 1985-86, c. 3, s. 76.(6). 
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drivers or request that they participate in roadside sobriety tests.65 
Nevertheless, for the majority, Charron J. emphasized the “operating 
requirements”66 of the “interlocking scheme of federal and provincial 
legislation”67 that governs all aspects of motor vehicle travel. Given the 
authority provided by that scheme for police to stop motorists and check 
on their sobriety, she reasoned that the power to ask drivers questions 
about their alcohol consumption and request that they perform sobriety 
tests arose by necessary implication.68  
With respect to the scope of these implied police powers, Charron J. 
invoked the common law as a guide on their potential limits.69 She 
quoted with approval from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
that had dealt with the scope of police power to check the sobriety of 
drivers at the roadside: “a procedure cannot be reasonable … unless it 
can be performed at the site of the detention, with dispatch, with no 
danger to the safety of the detainee and with minimal inconvenience to 
the detainee.”70 She then turned to the actual facts of the two appeals 
before the Court, emphasizing throughout that the limits on police 
authority in this context necessarily require a “case-specific inquiry”.71 
In other words, the exact contours of police authority will vary from 
case to case. According to the majority, this is unavoidable because it 
“is both impossible to predict all the aspects of such encounters and 
impractical to legislate exhaustive details as to how they must be 
conducted”.72 
Next, the majority turned to whether these implied powers could be 
reconciled with both the informational and implementation requirements 
of section 10(b). In other words, did these powers necessarily override 
the right to counsel? In Thomsen the Court had held that section 254(2) 
of the Criminal Code, the provision authorizing police officers to make 
                                                                                                            
65 See Highway Traffic Act, S.M. 1985-86, c. 3, s. 76.(1). 
66 Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at paras. 37, 39. 
67 Id., at para. 27.  
68 Id., at para. 43. 
69 See id., at para. 45. In particular, she quoted from Dedman, supra, note 58, where the 
Court in assessing whether the roadblock stop at issue in that case was justified under the second 
prong of the Waterfield test had probed whether that power was “necessary for the carrying out of 
the particular police duty and it must be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the liberty 
interfered with and the importance of the public purpose served by the interference”. Id., at 35.  
70 R. v. Ratelle, [1996] O.J. No. 372, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 58, at 73 (C.A.). 
71 Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at paras. 47, 49-50. 
72 Id., at para. 45. 
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an ALERT breath demand at the roadside where they suspect a driver 
has alcohol in his body, by necessary implication limited the right to 
counsel.73 Reasoning by analogy, the majority easily concluded that the 
screening procedures that are designed to furnish the grounds for such a 
demand must also do the same.74 The majority failed to acknowledge 
that from a technological standpoint much had changed since Thomsen 
was decided in 1988. The justification for finding an implied override of 
the right to counsel in that case was the impracticality of implementing 
that right at the roadside. Since then cellular phones have become 
commonplace, making the suggestion that Thomsen was controlling on 
the practical need for an override far from compelling. 
Nevertheless, with the required power in place and the need for an 
override of the right to counsel established, the majority next turned to 
its section 1 analysis. It very quickly concluded that the limitation on the 
right to counsel in this context constituted a reasonable limit under 
section 1 of the Charter.75  
In a strongly worded dissent LeBel J., joined by Fish J., took 
exception to the means by which the majority had found that there was a 
“limit prescribed by law” on the right to counsel in these two cases. The 
dissent criticized the majority’s “inventive use” of its “law-making 
powers” in this case,76 an approach it characterized as “utilitarian” and 
“based on expediency rather than legal principles”.77 The dissent 
described the majority’s analysis as essentially reducing down to little 
more than this: “Drunk driving is evil. Drunk driving is dangerous. 
Drunk drivers must be swiftly taken off the road. If there is something 
missing in the statute, let us read in the necessary powers. Failing that, 
let us go to the common law and find or create something there.”78  
                                                                                                            
73 See Thomsen, supra, note 62. 
74 Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at para. 52. 
75 The compelling state interest was supplied by the carnage caused by impaired drivers. 
The rational connection was provided by the impracticality of implementing the right at the 
roadside. Finally, when it came to the proportionality analysis the majority adopted the reasoning 
from R. v. Milne, [1996] O.J. No. 1728, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 118, at 128-31 (C.A.), leave refused, 
[1996] 3 S.C.R. xiii (note) which held that although the right to counsel does not apply during such 
roadside encounters the results of questioning and sobriety testing may only be used as an 
investigative tool to furnish grounds for a breath demand or arrest. A driver’s answers to police 
questions or his or her performance on sobriety tests are not admissible on the trial proper. See 
Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at paras. 54–58. 
76 Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at para. 70. 
77 Id., at para. 69. 
78 Id. 
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The dissent in Orbanski & Elias also takes up the larger institutional 
implications of the majority’s approach. It complains that the majority 
conflates the process of creating a police power that encroaches on 
Charter rights with the process of justifying it under section 1. The 
dissent expresses alarm at the long-term implications of the majority’s 
approach:  
The doctrine would now be encapsulated in the principle that what the 
police need, the police get, by judicial fiat if all else fails or if the 
legislature finds the adoption of legislation to be unnecessary or 
unwarranted. The courts would limit Charter rights to the full extent 
necessary to achieve the purpose of meeting the needs of police. The 
creation of and justification for the limit would arise out of an 
initiative of the courts.79 
The dissent in Orbanski & Elias represents the first sign of division 
on the Court regarding the use of law-making devices since the 
enterprise began 20 years ago in Dedman. In that case, Dickson C.J. had 
expressed similar concerns in his dissenting judgment, reminding the 
majority that it is “the function of the legislature, not the courts, to 
authorize . . . police action that would otherwise be unlawful as a 
violation of rights traditionally protected at common law.”80 The dissent 
in Orbanski & Elias makes the very same observation before candidly 
acknowledging a point that seems to escape the majority, that 
“legislatures are better equipped to investigate and assess the need for 
enhanced police powers and to integrate required changes into the 
relevant statutory scheme as a whole”.81 
Unfortunately, what ultimately emerges from the majority judgment 
in Orbanski & Elias is an open-ended power on the part of the police to 
do those things that are “reasonable” in the circumstances when carrying 
out sobriety check-steps. Clear guidance and concrete limits on the 
types of procedures permitted do not emerge from the judgment. 
Instead, we are told that ascertaining whether or not the police had legal 
authority to do what they did requires that every case be considered on 
                                                                                                            
79 Id., at para. 81. 
80 Dedman, supra, note 58, at 15 (Dickson C.J.C., dissenting). 
81 Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at para. 82 (LeBel J., dissenting). On the institutional 
shortcomings of courts as rule-making bodies and the comparative advantages of leaving the 
creation of police powers to Parliament see generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, 
note 57, at 55-61. 
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its own facts.82 This obviously gives police officers on the street wide 
latitude in deciding how these potentially intrusive encounters will 
unfold. In every case it will ultimately be up to a reviewing court to 
determine ex post facto whether the police behaved appropriately or 
unconstitutionally. Of course, if no one is charged the possibility that 
police abuses will escape detection is great. Due to its own institutional 
limitations, this is something the Court rarely acknowledges — largely 
because these are cases that for the very same reason it almost never 
sees.83  
The net result of all this is considerable uncertainty. It is far from 
clear what screening procedures police are entitled to carry out at the 
roadside when conducting a sobriety check-stop. The majority’s claim 
that police-motorist encounters are far too rich in their diversity to lend 
themselves to clear, comprehensive and prospective legislative guidance 
is not at all persuasive.84 Although no legislative scheme could ever 
address every potential eventuality, statutory guidance could go a 
considerable distance toward structuring and confining police discretion 
in a manner that at least reduces the potential for abuse.85  
Unfortunately, the majority’s judgment in Orbanski & Elias 
continues a disturbing trend that has emerged in the post-Charter era.86 
The Court has moved away from its traditional function of standing 
between the individual and the state alert to see that any intrusion on 
liberty is justified by law,87 in favour of a role that increasingly sees it 
playing a law-making function that is better left for legislatures. Not 
only does this breed uncertainty, it also contributes to an environment 
that makes it far less likely that Parliament will ever have any incentive 
to take the sort of comprehensive legislative action that is needed most 
                                                                                                            
82 See notes 69 through 72 and accompanying text.  
83 On the low visibility of police abuses, see generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of 
Dialogue”, supra, note 57, at 57-58. See also Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment?”, supra, note 59 
at 344.  
84 Supra, note 72 and accompanying text. 
85 See Kenneth C. Davis, Police Discretion (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1975) [Davis, 
Police Discretion] who long ago recognized the dangers of too little and too much discretion, 
arguing: “Unnecessary discretion must be eliminated. But discretion often is necessary and often 
must be preserved. Necessary discretion must be properly confined, structured and checked.” Id., at 
170. See more generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57.  
86 See generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57. 
87 This characterization of the role of the courts within the Anglo-Canadian constitutional 
system finds its genesis in Lord Atkin’s now celebrated dissenting judgment in Liversidge v. 
Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, at 244 (H.L.). 
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in order to achieve greater clarity as to the scope and limits on police 
power. 
Legal uncertainty always comes at a price. When it comes to police 
powers, however, the cost is especially high. This is because, as 
Skolnick warns: 
Whenever rules of constraint are ambiguous, they strengthen the very 
conduct they are intended to restrain. Thus, the police officer already 
committed to a conception of law as an instrument of order rather than 
as an end in itself is likely to utilize the ambiguity of the rules of 
restraint as a justification for testing or even violating them.88 
In this context uncertainty actually cuts against the very purpose 
underlying the Charter’s legal rights guarantees, that is, protecting 
individuals from abuses of state power during the criminal investigative 
process.89 Although when it comes to ascribing meaning to the Charter’s 
guarantees, a certain amount of uncertainty is unavoidable and even 
necessary, when it comes to the scope and limits on police power the 
opposite is true.90 In this context everyone benefits from certainty: police 
officers who must make snap decisions about the appropriateness of a 
particular course of action in response to fast-moving events in the field; 
individuals, who must decide whether or not to acquiesce to police 
power or risk prosecution; prosecutors, who must predict the likelihood 
of a successful prosecution; defence lawyers, who must advise their 
clients whether they have a meritorious Charter claim; and trial judges, 
who have the unenviable task of sorting through the mess and 
adjudicating on the merits of Charter claims that are brought.91 
                                                                                                            
88 Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society 
(New York: MacMillan, 1994), at 12.  
89 See generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57, at 13-17. 
90 See generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57. 
91 For a recent example of a trial judge openly acknowledging how difficult this task can be, 
see R. v. Binning, [2006] B.C.J. No. 820 (S.C.). The trial judge noted that what has emerged is a: 
… minefield through which the police must navigate, bearing in mind numerous trial and 
appellate decisions which offer a variety of sometimes conflicting paths for the 
investigating officers to follow as they carry out their enforcement activities. Given the 
intricacy of the law, it is little wonder that in this case, as in other cases, particularly those 
involving the drug trade, the energies expended by Crown, defence counsel, and the court 
are directed not to what might innocently be thought of as the crucial issue, that being 
whether the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed 
the alleged offence or offences, but with the painstakingly difficult task of ensuring that 
there has been no breach of the accuseds’ Charter rights by the police during their 
investigation. 
Id., at para. 11. 
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Finally, contrary to any suggestion that everything has been 
decided, Orbanski & Elias aptly illustrates that when it comes to the 
scope and limits on police power, far more remains to be decided than 
has been settled. Of course, every unanswered question in this important 
area has profound Charter implications. For example, knowing what the 
limits are on police authority to detain motorists is inextricably 
interwoven with the parameters of the constitutional right not to be 
arbitrarily detained that is guaranteed by section 9 of the Charter. By 
embracing case-by-case review as the means for assessing the breadth of 
police power, the Court has left the constitutional right vulnerable to 
indirect and gradual erosion as courts justify police actions from one 
decision to the next. Under this system far from becoming “firmly 
established” the governing principles seem to be growing increasingly 
elusive.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our modest goal was to evaluate the claim that we have finally reached 
a point in the Charter’s development with respect to questions regarding 
criminal justice where the governing principles have become firmly 
established and the time for experimentation has ended. Based simply 
on how few Charter cases with a criminal justice component were 
decided by the Supreme Court in 2005 one might be deceived into 
believing that this is in fact the case. Closer scrutiny of those judgments, 
however, reveals that there continues to be much uncertainty 
surrounding a number of very basic Charter issues. 
As our review of Pires & Lising and Henry in Part II illustrates, 
even questions that may sometimes seem settled are open for 
reconsideration under our common law constitutional system. In fact, 
some level of uncertainty is not only inevitable but also necessary. In a 
very real sense the long-term health of our Constitution and the integrity 
of our Supreme Court both depend on the Court’s willingness to 
reconsider its past constitutional decisions when the reasons for doing so 
are compelling and the resolve to refrain from doing so when they are 
not. In this sense, a view that “established principles” are better left 
alone could actually threaten the long-term stability of our constitutional 
system. 
At the same time, our critical review of Orbanski & Elias in Part III 
serves to illustrate that too much uncertainty can carry its own unique 
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dangers. When it comes to the source, scope and limits on police 
powers, clarity and comprehensiveness should be our goals. 
Unfortunately, the sort of uncertainty that is fuelled by a judgment like 
Orbanski & Elias brings its own pitfalls. Far from being well 
established, the very notion of implied police powers embraced by the 
Court in that case ensures that there will be much uncertainty into the 
future surrounding a number of basic issues that have profound 
constitutional implications. 
In summary, the idea that everything has been decided and that there 
is little room for constitutional experimentation when it comes to the 
Charter and criminal justice is not borne out by the Supreme Court’s 
judgments from 2005. There continues to be much uncertainty 
surrounding a number of very basic but important constitutional issues 
relating to the criminal justice system. Rather than having ended, the 
time for experimentation seems to have just begun.  
 
 
